Slowing the arms race

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 1977

Unfortunately, in the aftermath of the 1972 SALT I agreements neither the United States nor the Soviet Union have slowed their strategic arms buildups. The ABM Treaty removed much of the military need for more offensive weapons, and the Interim Agreement on Offensive Weapons froze for 5 years the number of strategic missiles which both nations could have deployed. However, the latter agreement did nothing to control the replacement of old weapons by new ones (in fact, it specifically encouraged such replacements in the case of submarine-launched missiles), and no restrictions were placed on MIRVs. These loopholes have become a stimulus to the arms race.

Now, on October 3 the 5-year Interim Agreement expires, and unless some tangible progress in SALT is obtained by that date, this could--despite Administration statements that they are not negotiating under this deadline--give additional impetus to the development and procurement of new weapons.

In these five years, the United States has doubled the number of its strategic warheads and bombs from about 4,500 to about 9,000. MIRVs have replaced many of our single warheads, and we have begun development of a new class of strategic weapons--cruise missiles--which were not even involved in the SALT I agreements. Now it is these weapons that are creating the most difficult problem for SALT II. The Soviet Union, following in U.S. footsteps, has begun putting MIRVs on its missiles and has tested and begun deploying more than three new models of ICBMs and several versions of a new submarine ballistic missile system. Since 1972 they have increased the number of their warheads and bombs from 2,500 to 3,650.

The Vladivostok Accords of 1974 did nothing to halt these buildups and, in fact, set ceilings so high that they served to encourage rather than discourage the continuing arms race. A disagreement arose between the United States and the Soviet Union over whether cruise missiles were even included in these ceilings.

Thus, in the fall of 1977, we arc faced with trying once again to find some mechanism to bring the dangerous and costly arms race under control. At the end of March, Secretary of State Vance presented to the Soviets two alternative proposals designed to initiate a meaningful dialogue on strategic arms limitations between the new Carter administration and the regime of Secretary General Brezhnev, which may be approaching its final days. Regrettably, but not surprisingly, these proposals were flatly rejected in Moscow. Since then, the negotiations have been resumed with somewhat less fanfare and, therefore, with greater chance of success.

The Carter initiatives at Moscow covered both ends of the arms control spectrum--from a very advanced comprehensive proposal, which included significant reductions in existing stockpiles and stringent controls on the development and deployment of new types of missile systems, to a return to the simple Vladivostok ceilings, leaving to the future decisions on U.S. cruise missiles and the Soviet Backfire bomber.

The latter would have little arms control significance other than to clear the air for future, more constructive approaches; and it was predictably unacceptable because of the loophole on cruise missiles.

The former, the comprehensive proposal, was the first serious offer by either government to address the critical issues that must be faced if the arms race is to be truly slowed. However, it was much too big a menu for the Soviets to accept on short notice and was also vulnerable to the accusation of being inequitable. The comprehensive proposal purportedly dealt with cruise missiles: it permitted such weapons up to a maximum range of 2,500 kilometers, a range which casts serious doubt on the sincerity of National Security Advisor Brzezinski's statement that the ban was on all strategic cruise missiles.

Despite the cold reception given the Carter proposals in Moscow, there is still good reason to hope that meaningful limitations can be agreed upon somewhere between the two extremes put forth.

The Brezhnev regime is strongly committed to the principles of the Vladivostok Accords, partly because of the internal political capital already expended to achieve it. Thus, it is likely that the next phase of the negotiations will start from that end of the spectrum.

Cruise missiles will have to be dealt with in some fashion even though they present probably the most difficult item which SALT negotiators have yet had to address. Perhaps there can be a meaningful compromise between the 2,500-kilometer range for land- and sea-launched cruise missiles in the Carter comprehensive proposal and the 600-kilometer range previously put forth by the Soviet Union. The range for air-launched missiles could be kept at 2,500 kilometers, a range the Soviets apparently agreed to in 1976. There is still disagreement over whether the aircraft for launching missiles of this range should be counted within the MIRVed delivery vehicle ceiling.

Perhaps the Vladivostok ceiling of 2,400 total delivery vehicles can be lowered to somewhat more meaningful levels without going as far as those proposed by President Carter (1,800 to 2,000). The MIRVed delivery vehicle ceilings can also easily be reduced to the new Carter levels (1, I 00 to 1,200). Hopefully, some progress may also be made in dealing with the problem of replacement of old weapons; but this would have to be dealt with in SALT II by agreed principles leaving the specifics to SALT Ill.

The recent discussions at Geneva--first between Paul Warnke, the U.S. SALT negotiator, and his Soviet counterpart V. Semenov, and then later between Secretary Vance and Gromyko--at least led to some progress in re-establishing a dialogue. Apparently, some agreement was reached on a future three-tiered framework for dealing with the critical issues.

The first tier would be a formal 8-year treaty (to expire in 1985) dealing with ceilings similar to the Vladivostok Accords, but perhaps at somewhat lower levels. However, any reductions would not go as far as President Carter proposed in March. The second tier would be a 3-year protocol which would put some restrictions on cruise missiles, mobile missiles, MIRVed heavy ICBMs, and Backfire bomber deployments. The third tier would establish principles for continued negotiations to reach more significant arms limitations, such as those included in the comprehensive proposal presented in Moscow.

The key issue in slowing the arms race is to control the continuing programs to incorporate new technology into weapons systems. Many of these so-called improvements are destabilizing and lead to lesser security rather than greater. For example, improving the accuracy and the useful payload of missiles, that is, giving them so-called counterforce capabilities, can be very dangerous for it can increase the risk of a nuclear conflict either by accident or by preemption in time of crisis. President Carter's proposal attempted for the first time to address this issue by placing controls on new ICBMs--a low annual quota on ICBM tests, and a limit on the numbers of heavy MIRVed missiles.

Since formal agreements on most such items will only be discussed as a part of the third tier, it may be some time, perhaps even years, before they could take effect. Thus, unless some other actions are taken, the next generation of missiles will be developed, and they will have dangerous counterforce capabilities. The politics of arms control negotiations appear too ponderous to be relied on to prevent such risky developments from coming to pass. Therefore, it is essential that both the United States and the Soviet Union undertake independent actions to restrain their weapons programs while arms control negotiations inch their way forward.

President Carter's decision to cancel the B-1 instead of procuring it as ephemeral bargaining chip is a good example of wise national restraint.

Just because an early, formal agreement to limit counterforce ICBMs cannot be reached is no reason for the United States to move forward rapidly to develop the MX missile as a replacement for the Minuteman ICBM or procure the interim MK-12A higher yield Minuteman warhead with a more accurate guidance system. Similarly, the Soviet Union need not go blindly forward deploying more and more MIRVed heavy SS-18 ICBMs. Neither nation's security will be enhanced by having such weapons regardless of what the other does.

If the arms race is to be slowed and the world spared increasing risks of nuclear devastation, then the two nuclear superpowers must adopt an arms control program that simultaneously combines independent restraint in their national weapons programs with serious and prompt negotiation of significant strategic arms limitation agreements.

Herbert Scoville, Jr., formerly technical director of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and assistant director of U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, is currently vice president of the Arms Control Association and a consultant in the field of arms control and strategic studies living in McLean, Virginia.